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ABSTRACT 
 
In some developing countries the potential exists for agroterrorism to cause 
widespread disruption through loss of sustenance, income and production. Defense of 
agriculture may also be problematic because of the lack stability and basic biosecurity 
infrastructure for the detection and prevention of diseases or invasive species.  Currently 
new methodological approaches for terrorism risk assessments are being actively 
explored for resource prioritization. One such methodology for risk based allocation of 
resources is Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence (TVC) Analysis.  A qualitative 
application of the TVC framework is used to analyze the risk of agroterrorism in 
developing countries relative to industrialized countries. The analysis suggests that 
evidence exists to demonstrate general terrorist threats, vulnerability of agriculture and, 
depending on the country, potentially serious consequences arising from argoterrorism.  
Where specific threats emerge, action may be needed by the international community to 
strengthen biosecurity systems in developing countries through: increasing global 
cooperation, capacity building in monitoring, remediation and risk analysis technologies, 
and the dissemination of novel technologies for control of pests and diseases.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Many developing countries are reliant on agricultural production for their well-
being. The consequences of sharp declines in productivity may be famines, disruptions, 
and diversion of limited foreign aid to disaster management and away from developments 
and the loss of important sources of export earnings. The relationships between rural 
poverty, agricultural production and political instability are well studied by De Soysa and 
Gleditsch (1999).  Significantly countries with GDPs in the range of 250-5000 USD are 
typically heavily dependent on agricultural production for their economic prosperity and 
in this context agroterrorism has the potential to cause continued instability and slow 
growth, further destabilizing governments and creating favorable environments for 
insurgent activity, exacerbating the problems of underdevelopment.  If it can be shown 
that (certain) developing countries are at risk of terrorist attacks on their food chains, it 
will be justified to spend resources to deal with this risk. However, in view of competing 
interests in the allocation of scarce resources to meet development goals, and in view of 
modest current levels of development aid, such measures would have to be based on a 
careful analysis.  Therefore in this paper we qualitatively explore the relative risk of 
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agroterrorism between industrialized and developing countries by applying Threat, 
Vulnerability, and Consequence (TVC) Analysis (Willis et al. 2004).   
Our application of the TVC analysis framework to the problem of agro-terrorism 
risk evaluation is motivated from an increasingly apparent need to provide national policy 
makers with risk assessment tools that can be used to help guide the allocation of security 
resources. Broadly developed and developing countries share many characteristics that 
make may make them attractive targets for agroterrorism including: 
1.  the proliferation of terrorist groups who have grievances against both 
developed and developing countries; 
2.  the dependence of a significant portion of the economy on agricultural 
exports and imports; and 
3.  the large scale of agriculture. 
 
Additionally developing countries suffer from: 
1.  a lack of capacity to monitor for potential agricultural pests and diseases; 
2.  a lack of expertise is in risk assessment practice and decision-making; 
3.  poor existing security measures; and 
4.  often fragile economic circumstances. 
 
By organizing and discussing these issues within the TVC framework we hope to 
demonstrate, at least qualitatively, the utility and applicability of the framework for the 
emerging issue of agroterrorism.
3  
In general some work now links the need for development to address security 
concerns.  For example DFID (2005) cites evidence that countries with per capita GDP 
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levels of $250 USD have a 15 percent risk of experiencing a civil war within the next five 
years. Where countries with per capita GDP levels of $5,000 USD the risk of civil war is 
less than one percent.  However the empirical evidence is less clear on linkages between 
development and terrorism.  Krueger and Malečková, (2003) argue that there is little 
evidence of direct linkages between poverty and terrorism but that there may be indirect 
linkages.  In this paper we restrict our attention to agroterrorism and the immediate 
response that can be developed to deal with such threats.  However, longer term policies 
associated with promoting development may well contribute towards reducing the threat 
level, vulnerability and consequences associated with agroterrorism.  
The remainder of this paper is divided as follows.  Section 2 elaborates the TVC 
framework. Section 3 applies the framework to qualitative assessment of relative risk of 
agroterrorism in industrialized and developing countries. Section 4 discusses a number of 
policy measures that can be used to deal with agroterrorism in developing countries. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
DEFINING AGRO-TERRORISM 
The United Nations defines terrorism as “any action that is intended to cause 
death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such 
act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or compel a Government or an 
international organization to do or abstain from doing any act (UN 2004).  Agroterrorism 
is more narrowly defined as the deliberate disruption of the production and distribution of 





threats against food or water to create anxiety and manipulate the main target audience, 
turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on 
whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.
4  Agroterrorism can 
take many forms, including poisoning livestock, or introducing and/or deliberately 
spreading plant and animal pathogens. 
THE THREAT-VULNERABILITY-CONSEQUENCES (TVC) ANALYSIS 
FRAMEWORK 
Traditionally, risk has been defined as the triplet  i i i x p s , ,  where si is the risk 
scenario and each si has a probability pi of occurring and a consequence xi if it occurs 
(Kaplan and Garrick 1981, Kaplan 1997).  Specific disciplines use modifications of this 
general definition that reflect the underlying structures of the risks they encounter.  For 
example in engineering risk is generally defined as the probability of an event occurring 
multiplied by its associated consequence, reflecting the risk of failure rates or industrial 
accidents (Stewart and Melchers 1997).  In actuarial science insurance companies are 
concerned about the risk of insolvency and calculate the probability of ruin, which is the 
risk that the insurer’s surplus (assets – liabilities) falls below zero (Dickson and Waters 
1992).   Similarly we need a definition of terrorism risk that reflects the underlying 
structure of the risk. 
Terrorism risk may be thought of as function of the threat level, vulnerability to 
the threat, and consequence from the terrorist action (Willis et al. 2004). For example, the 
risk estimate could refer to an attack by terrorists against food trade using a particular 
disease or toxin. The threat would then be an estimate of the terrorists’ priority for such 
                                                           






as attack against the available alternatives. Vulnerability could be estimated as likelihood 
of port interception and the consequences would be an assessment of the impact of the 
disease. Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence analysis is an interactive approach designed 
to elicit areas where high threat levels, extreme vulnerabilities, and high consequences 
overlap (Figure 1).  It is the intersection of these events that cause security concerns.  The 
following section discusses in more detail which factors have to be considered when 
applying this framework to agroterrorism. 




























APPLYING THE TVC ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK TO AGROTERRORISM 
Figure 2 shows the factors that need to be considered in order to assess the levels 
of threat, vulnerability and consequences with regard to agroterror. 





























The purpose of the threat assessment is to gain an understanding of where 
terrorists are targeting their activities; typically based on intelligence information 
gathered from a variety of sources.  Threats may be general or specific and security 
responses are conditioned on the nature of the information received. Typically an analysis 
will first assess whether a country or region is under a general threat from terrorist 
attacks. If this is the case, the next step is to analyze whether terrorists are likely to attack 
the food chain, which will turn the general into a specific agroterrorist threat. Existing 
empirical evidence suggests that the frequency of agroterrorist attacks is very low, with 
the documented attack rate being less than once in every four years (Parker 2002).  
However, such estimates are backward looking and do not taken into account the 
evolving security environment.   
We argue, based on rational-choice considerations (compare Krueger and 
Malečková, 2003), that terrorist (organization) will choose agroterrorist actions in 
addition to other actions, if agroterrorist means contribute to reaching their goals for 
relatively low cost and have high impact. Therefore it would be rational for terrorists to 
attack the food chain, if this allows them to realize their goals to a larger extent with 
lower costs than would be incurred by other means. However, one has to consider both 
the economic and the political dimension of costs and benefits. For example, if a terrorist 
group has an anti-poverty ideology, using a technique that hits mostly poor people 
implies a political cost, because it reduces the credibility of their cause. It may also be 
argued that the rational-choice model has limitations in explaining suicide attacks.   
The rational-choice model proposed implies that the following factors are crucial 





of obtaining and using technologies for agro-terrorism as compared to technologies 
needed for other types of terrorism. (2) The contribution of an agro-terrorist attack to the 
goals of the terrorist group under consideration, as compared to the contributions 
achieved by other types of attacks. This implies that one has to study the goals of the 
terrorist groups under consideration and assess how the consequences of different types 
of terrorist attacks would contribute to reaching their goals. The rational choice 
consideration links the different elements of the analytical framework, because the 
terrorists will consider perceived vulnerability and consequences in deciding on whether 
to launch an agro-terrorist attack.  
Vulnerability 
As shown in Figure 2, the vulnerability against an agro-terrorist attack depends on 
the structure of agricultural production, on the controls that are in place at the borders and 
on the monitoring systems in the food chain. If the public health system is 
underdeveloped, a country is also more vulnerable because it is less able to detect and 
deal with the consequences to human health. 
Consequences 
It is useful to distinguish between the consequences for the agricultural producers, 
for the consumers, and for the economy as a whole. Accordingly, we suggest considering 
farm incomes, food safety and food security, and export earnings as the major 
consequences. One can also distinguish between the short- and long-term consequences, 
which may have both an economic dimension (loss of productive capacity and food 







3.  EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we use the framework presented in Section 2 for an exploratory 
analysis of the question whether developing countries are comparatively more or less at 
risk from agro-terrorism than industrialized countries. 
THREAT ASSESSMENT 
The purpose of the threat assessment is to gain an understanding of where terrorist 
are targeting their activities. According to the analytical framework outlined in Section 2, 
the threat assessment proceeds in two steps: (1) assessing whether the country – and 
which regions in the country – are under threat of terrorist attacks, and (2) assessing 
whether terrorists are likely to attack the food chain, rather than launching terrorist 
attacks against other targets. In practice, this assessment is typically this based on 
intelligence information gathered from a variety of sources.  The nature of the 
information received may allow the analysts to find out whether the threats are general or 
specific.   
Contrary to popularly held perceptions, developed countries are not the only 
targets of terrorists.  Local political conditions in many developing countries have led to 
extensive campaigns by local terrorist groups.  Table 1 provides a summary of some 
terrorist organizations operating in developing countries, based on data from the US 






Table 1: A summary of some terrorist organizations operating in developing countries.  The list is not exhaustive and more 
detailed information on the activities of the organizations listed below and other organizations can be obtained 
from: Patterns of Global Terrorism. 2003. United States Department of State 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003. 
 
.Country  Terrorist Groups  Aims  Operational sphere of 
influence 
Recent activities 
India  •  Harakat ul-Mujahidin 
(HUM) 
•  Jaish-e-Mohammed 
(JEM) 
Creation of an independent state 
in Kashmir. 
Indian administered 
Kashmir from bases in 
Pakistan. 
Operations against Indian military 
targets in Jammu and Kashmir. 
Philippines  •  Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG),  
•  New People’s Army 
(NPA), 
•  Alex Boncayao 
Brigade (ABB) 
ASG: Creation of an 
independent Islamic state in the 
southern Philippines. 
 
NPA and ABB: The 
establishment of a Marxist state 
in the Philippines. NPA is the 
mainly rural armed wing of the 
Communist Party of the 
Philippines, and ABB is an 
urban-based split-off group 
from NPA. 
Various groups operate 
in the Philippines with 
Islamic extremists 
operating in the southern 
Philippines. 
Operations involve kidnappings for 
ransom, bombings, beheadings, 
assassinations, and extortion, 
within the Philippines. 
Malaysia  •  Kumpulan Mujahidin 
Malaysia (KMM) 
KMM favors the overthrow of 
the Malaysian Government and 
the creation of an Islamic state 
comprising Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and the southern 
Philippines. 
Operations throughout 
Malaysia, with links to 
groups operating in 
Indonesia and the 
southern Philippines. 
Activities include bombings and 
robberies, and the murder of a 






Indonesia  •  Jemaah Islamiya (JI)  Stated goal of creating an 
Islamic state comprising 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, the southern 
Philippines, and southern 
Thailand. 
Southeast Asian–based 
terrorist network with 
links to al-Qaida. 
Australian embassy bombing in 
2004. The J. W. Marriott Hotel in 
Jakarta August 2003, the Bali 
bombings October 2002, and an 
attack against the Philippine 




•        
Sri Lanka  •  Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
LTTE aims to establish a Tamil 
homeland. The LTTE is 
currently observing a cease-fire 
agreement with the Sri Lankan 
Government.  
The Tigers control most 
of the northern and 
eastern coastal areas of 
Sri Lanka but have 
conducted operations 
throughout the island. 
The terrorist program targets key 
personnel in the countryside and 
senior Sri Lankan political and 
military leaders in Colombo and 
other urban centers. Political 
assassinations and bombings are 
commonplace. 
Egypt  •  Al-Gama’a al-
Islamiyya 
(Islamic Group, IG) 
Egypt’s largest militant group, 
active since the late 1970s, 
appears to be loosely organized. 
Has an external wing with 
supporters in several countries 
worldwide. The group issued a 
cease-fire in March 1999 
Operates mainly in the 
Al-Minya, Asyut, Qina, 
and Sohaj Governorates 
of southern 
Egypt. Also appears to 
have support in Cairo, 
Alexandria, and other 
urban locations, 
Group conducted armed attacks 
against Egyptian security and other 
government officials, Coptic 
Christians, and Egyptian opponents 
of Islamic extremism before the 
cease-fire. From 1993 until the 
cease-fire. 
Columbia  •  Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) 
The establishment of a Marxist 
government in Columbia. 
FARC was established in 1964 
by the Colombian Communist 
Party to defend what were then 
autonomous Communist-
controlled rural areas. 
Primarily in Colombia.  Bombings, murder, mortar attacks, 
narcotrafficking, kidnapping, 
extortion, hijacking, as well as 
guerrilla and conventional military 





Somalia  •  Al-Ittihad al-Islami 
(AIAI) 
Establishment of an Islamic 
government. 
Primarily in Somalia, 
with limited presence in 
Ethiopia and Kenya. 
The group is believed to be 
responsible for a series of bomb 
attacks in public places in Addis 
Ababa in 1996 and 1997 as well as 
the kidnapping of several relief 
workers in 1998. 
Rwanda  •  Army for the 
Liberation of Rwanda 
(ALIR) 
ALIR seeks to topple Rwanda’s 
Tutsi-dominated government, 
reinstitute Hutu domination, 
and, possibly, complete the 
genocide. 
Mostly eastern 
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. 
The Armed Forces of Rwanda 
(FAR) was the army of the ethnic 
Hutu-dominated Rwandan regime 
that carried out the genocide of 
500,000 or more Tutsis and regime 
opponents in 1994. Ongoing 
operations against the government 





While some terrorist incidents can be explained by attacks against US interests, the 
majority of attacks are directed against the national interests of the developing country in 
which the attacks occur (US Department of State 2003).  The examples in table 1 are 
provided to demonstrate the presence of a general threat in some developing countries.  
However, in developing countries where no terrorist organizations with national targets 
are active, the general risk of terrorism may be lower than in industrialized countries. 
Nethertheless, many developing countries are at risk due to actions occurring in violent 
conflicts and wars which can also lead to attacks on the food chain. As discussed in 
Section 2, a general threat is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a specific 
threat against agriculture. There is some evidence that general threats are more likely to 
be turned into specific threats of agro-terrorism in the future, because there is a growing 
interest among terrorist groups in the use of biological agents. More than seventy percent 
(19 of 27) of confirmed bioterrorism cases occurred in the 1990s (Carus 2001).   
With regard to industrialized countries, many observers and intelligence analysts 
in the West consider the occurrence of agro-terrorism to be a “low probability - high 
consequence” event, largely because terrorists act against their primary targets, such as 
transport hubs, directly creating anxiety, fear, and disruption. However, there is growing 
concern that industrialized countries may be more at risk than developing countries based 
on the assumption that terrorists may utilize agroterrorism as other types of terrorist 
attacks become more difficult due to increased controls
5 (Frazier and Richardson 1999). 
Some estimates are available from the experience in the United States, which suggests 
that that the frequency of agroterrorist attacks is very low, with the documented attack 
                                                           






rate being less than once in every four years (Parker 2002). Analysts also suggest that 
such attacks are unlikely to threaten food security in developed countries (Wheelis et al. 
2002),
 despite substantial economic costs.   
In developing countries, the contribution of agriculture to the gross domestic 
product (GDP) and to the employment of the labour force is much larger than in 
industrialized countries (see below). Therefore, the question arises whether in countries 
under general threat, terrorist groups are more likely to use agroterrorist means than they 
are in industrialized countries. There are few documented examples of actual acts of 
agroterrorism, using disease or toxins, in developing countries. One example was 
reported in 1952, when British colonial authorities charged that individuals associated 
with the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya had used a plant toxin to poison livestock (Carus 
2001). The picture becomes different, if one includes attacks against the food chain 
occurring in conflicts and wars.  As historians of hunger have noted, “Hunger as a 
weapon is at least as old as the first siege of a city” (Kates and Millman, 1990). The 
destruction of crops and looting of cattle by militia aligned with the government in 
Darfur, Sudan (Human Rights Watch 2004) is perhaps the most recent example. 
According to the rational choice considerations above, the availability and costs 
of techniques to be used for agroterrorism influences the likelihood that a general threat is 
turned into a specific threat. In this context, one has to note that terrorists have relatively 
easy access to pathogenic bacteria such as anthrax (and their complete gene sequences); 
potent and accessible chemical agents such as ricin, which can be made from by-products 
of castor oil production (ARS 2001); and other pathogens causing diseases in crops and 





the world’s key crops: potato beetle, fungal spores that cause cereal rust, wheat smut, and 
rice blast, and highly contagious animal diseases such as foot and mouth (WHO 2004a), 
rinderpest, and avian influenza (WHO 2004b).  
A second issue to be considered according to the rational choice considerations 
above is the degree to which an agroterrorist attack contributes to the goals of a terrorist 
organization, in comparison to the contributions from other available techniques. 
Terrorist groups involved in an ethnic conflict, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam in Sri Lanka, may use agroterrorist techniques only if the damage can be confined 
to the ethnic group against which they are fighting. This is unlikely to be the case for 
plant diseases, except for situations where the ethnic groups in conflict grow and 
consume completely different crops. For the same reason, state actors engaged in attacks 
against parts of their own population may not use plant diseases. Terrorist groups with a 
Marxist ideology, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, may not choose 
an agroterrorist action that negatively affects rural small-holders, because of the political 
costs involved in such an action that contradicts their own ideology, and the threat to the 
drug crops that fund the rebellion. An agro-terrorist attack using a livestock disease that 
would affect mainly the large-scale cattle-keeping landowners might, however, be more 
plausible for such a terrorist organization. Since the terrorist groups operating in 
developing countries differ widely with regard to their goals (see table 1), a case-by-case 
analysis would be required for assessing whether the emergence of a specific threat to 
agriculture is likely to occur. Moreover, in the absence of intelligence, it is difficult to 





environment in some developing countries, the above considerations show that a specific 
threat against agriculture could develop. 
VULNERABILITIES 
According to the framework developed in Section 2, an assessment of 
vulnerabilities should at least consider the issues of border and farm security and 
monitoring of human, animal and plant health. 
 
Border security 
Industrialized countries reduce their vulnerability against terrorist attacks by 
controlling people and material crossing their borders. Even though major reasons for 
operating comprehensive border control systems in industrialized countries include 
preventing illegal immigration and controlling and taxing import commodities, having 
border control systems in place facilitates controls regarding terrorist attacks. The 
resources needed for a comprehensive border control system are, however, considerable. 
One of the best documented examples which serves to illustrate the issues of border 
security and the difficulties inherent in ensuring the integrity of borders are the efforts of 
the USA to control the influx of drugs. Each year, 60 million people enter the United 
States on more than 675,000 commercial and private flights. Another 6 million come by 
sea and 370 million by land. In addition, 116 million vehicles cross the land borders with 
Canada and Mexico. More than 90,000 merchant and passenger ships dock at U.S. ports. 
These ships carry more than 9 million shipping containers and 400 million tons of cargo. 
Another 157,000 smaller vessels visit coastal towns (DEA 2004).  The US has 





surveillance activities, additional airport security and tighter passport control and 
increased port inspections (DHS 2004).   
In developing countries, the resources spent on border control are typically much 
lower than in industrialized countries, since the scarcity of available resources means that 
other goals have higher priorities. As a consequence, the vulnerability with regard to this 
factor is generally considerably higher. The difficulties faced by developing countries in 
securing borders can be illustrated by an example where considerable resources have 
been spent: India’s efforts in securing the Kashmiri border with Pakistan. In 1947-8 and 
again in 1965 India and Pakistan fought wars over Jammu and Kashmir. Since 1989 there 
has been a growing and often violent separatist movement against Indian rule in Kashmir 
fueled by the movements of arms and fighters from Pakistan. In 1999 India fought 
Pakistani-backed forces that had infiltrated Indian-controlled territory in the Kargil area. 
The example demonstrates the difficulty developing countries face in securing borders 
against the determined efforts of terrorists. 
Farm security  
The vulnerability for agroterrorist attacks also depends on the structure of 
agricultural production and food consumption. The larger the proportion of crops for 
which agroterrorist techniques are available, the higher is the vulnerability. The same 
applies to livestock.   
As a result of rising incomes and urbanization, developing-country consumers are 
demanding more meat and dairy products in their diets. As a direct result of this, demand 
is increasing for cereal crops, particularly to feed livestock.  Net cereal imports by 
developing countries are expected to double between 1997 and 2020 and their net meat 





also rising (Rosegrant et al. 2001). As developing countries produce more grain and more 
livestock, there are more potential terrorist targets.  
The change in food consumption patterns has the effect that especially livestock 
production and imports in developing countries are becoming comparatively more 
vulnerable. The rising demand for meat is being satisfied through intensive types of 
livestock production such as battery hen farms and cattle feed lots.  The highly crowded 
conditions that characterize intensive livestock production combined with poor security 
on farms such as the lack of fencing, patrols, and locks, and a high dependence on 
agriculture imply a high vulnerability, which may make it more likely that livestock 
production will provide a tempting target for terrorists.  Under intensive farming 
conditions, outbreaks of contagious diseases are difficult to contain and can be highly 
disruptive of food production, resulting in extensive culling of animals. For example 
intensive feedlots in the US hold as many as 150,000-300,000 head of beef, and cattle are 
transported from one site to another as they mature or to be slaughtered. Other examples 
include the intensive battery hen farms prevalent in Asia and persistent out breaks of 
avian influenza. These conditions may facilitate the spread of disease from a single 
animal. A factor which contributes to the vulnerability of both crop and livestock 
production in developing countries is that the agricultural research and extension systems 
are less developed than in industrialized countries. As a consequence, the capacity to 
cope in a timely and effective manner with crop or livestock disease problems caused by 
agro-terrorist attacks is lower.  
Monitoring 
Food safety is receiving greater attention as the important links between food and 





improving food security. All countries share similar concerns about food safety, but the 
relative importance of different risks varies with climate, diets, income levels, and public 
infrastructure. Some food safety risks are greater in developing countries, where poor 
sanitation and unsafe drinking water pose greater risks to human health than in developed 
countries (Unnevehr 2003).  
Under the conditions described above a reliable monitoring system is critical for 
detecting and preventing the spread of disease before damage is inflicted (RAND 2003).  
This need was graphically demonstrated by recent outbreaks of avian influenza.  The 
absence of prompt control measures backed by a good surveillance system might have 
contributed to the long and devastating effects from 1992 to 1995 in Mexico (CDC 
2004). On the other hand, the prompt culling of Hong Kong’s entire poultry population in 
1997 was considered to have averted an influenza pandemic.  
CONSEQUENCES 
As shown in Figure 2, one can distinguish four types of consequences of an 
agroterrorist attack affecting the domestic supply of food, rural livelihoods, potential 
export revenues, and the safety of food in importing countries.   
In many developing countries,  decreases in food and cash crop production have 
far-reaching consequences, which is due to their agricultural and economic conditions. 
Many developing countries suffer from chronic food shortages due to the large share of 
agriculture that is rainfed and depends on often unpredictable and increasingly variable 
weather conditions. In these countries, typically, the majority of low-income people (75 
percent) (IFAD 2001) depend directly or indirectly on agriculture for their livelihoods 





Andersen et al. 1999).   The impacts of crop and livestock infestations can be devastating. 
There are impressive historical examples to illustrate this point. The Irish Potato blight 
killed one million people and forced another million people to leave Ireland (Rogers et. al 
1999).  More recently, avian influenza in Hong Kong cost hundreds of millions of dollars 
in lost poultry production, commerce, and tourism (US National Intelligence Council 
2000).   
Conceivably, agroterrorism could lead to disruption of food supplies sufficient to 
lead to food price hikes, leading potentially to food riots in urban areas. In addition, many 
developing-country governments depend heavily on earnings from cash crop exports such 
as coffee, cotton, sugar, or cocoa as a major source of public spending. Often, developing 
countries depend on a few or even a single such crop for the bulk of hard currency 
earnings; for example, in war-torn Burundi, coffee accounts for 62 percent of all export 
revenues (Messer and Cohen 2004).   
On the domestic side, table 2 shows that the share of agriculture in the gross 
domestic product (GDP) in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa is 18-23 percent, 
compared to 2 percent in the United States and European Union member states. Figure 3 
shows that in all African subregions, domestic cereal production accounts for less than 85 














































Source: FAO Food Outlook (June 2004), FAO Foodcrops and Shortages (May 2004) 
 
 
Food aid often fills in the gap. Production of adequate amounts of nutritious food is of 
highest concern in these countries (Islam 1995; Pinstrup-Andersen
 et al. 1999), and any 
disruption of food supply due to agroterrorism may create the potential for famine if food 
assistance or commercial food imports are not readily available. 
On the export side, Table 2 also shows that the share of food in the exports of 
Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa is double or more 





Table 2--Structure of economy by region, 2002 
Share out of merchandise export  Region   Share of agriculture 
in GDP  Food Manufactures 
   (percentage) 
Low and middle income countries     
  East Asia & Pacific   15  7  79 
  Europe & Central Asia   9  6  57 
  Latin America & Carib.  7  22  48 
  Middle East & N. Africa  11  4  19 
  South Asia   23  13  77 
  Sub-Saharan Africa   18  17  35 
High income countries   2 7  82 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004. 
 
Given the high volume of agricultural products that enter into international trade, the 
deliberate or accidental contamination of food in one country can have significant 
impacts in other parts of the world and lead to serious economic damage for the exporting 
country.  An example of the deliberate contamination of food exports occurred in 1978, 
when the Arab Revolutionary Army poisoned Israeli citrus exports to Europe.  An 
example of accidental contamination occurred in 1989 when exported cantaloupes from 
Mexico infected approximately 25,000 people in the U.S. with salmonella poisoning 
(Carus 2001).  In 1985 the United States suspended Chilean grape imports after receiving 
threats that the grapes had been contaminated with cyanide (FAO 2003). It is estimated 
that this incident cost Chilean growers upwards of 333 million dollars (Ban 2000). These 
examples indicate that threats against agricultural exports can be used as effective terror 





NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The application of the TVC analysis framework shows that, not surprisingly, developing 
countries have a higher vulnerability for agroterrorist attacks than industrialized 
countries. The factors that increase the vulnerability of a country are related to general 
problems of the current level of development, agricultural production, food security, and 
food safety in developing countries. These factors have been subject to research for many 
years, and there is typically sufficient information available. The same applies to the 
assessment of the consequences of agroterrorist attacks: to the extent that data on the 
structure of the agricultural sector is available, an assessment of potential consequences is 
possible. A need for further research, however, exists with regard to assessing the threat, 
especially the specific threat of agroterrorist attacks. The rational choice considerations 
presented above can be helpful in identifying the issues to be studied. However, empirical 
research in this field is obviously difficult and dangerous. There are few examples of 
empirical studies dealing with terrorism that are based on primary rather than on 
secondary data (see the review by Krueger and Malečková, 2003). Obviously, 
intelligence activities rather than scientific research is necessary to obtain much of the 
empirical information that would be required to assess specific threats. Nevertheless, 
given the high vulnerability of developing countries and the potentially large 
consequences, efforts to learn more about specific threats appear justified. This would 
allow countries and aid agencies to make informed decisions on the question whether and 






4.  POTENTIAL RESPONSES 
This section discusses potential responses to the risk of agroterrorism. The 
analytical framework presented in Section 2 is used to categorize the possible responses. 
As discussed above, the extent to which a country or aid agency should invest resources 
in potential measures against agroterrorism should depend on the outcome of a risk 
assessment. However, as further detailed below, a number of activities that are justified 
on other grounds will also have the side-effect to reduce the risk of agroterrorist attacks. 
ADDRESSING THREATS 
According to the above analysis, activities that reduce the general threat of 
terrorism and conflicts will also reduce the specific threat of agroterrorist attacks. There 
is evidence that international efforts to increase security in developing countries should 
receive more attention. A recent case study of Uganda by IFPRI (Zhang 2004) found that 
security is a pre-condition for successful economic development and that there is in fact a 
threshold level of security below which public investments in infrastructure and 
education have little impact on growth.  
One has to acknowledge, however, that international efforts to promote increased 
security in developing countries are inherently difficult, because conflicts typically occur 
in countries where national governments have limited legitimacy and where far-reaching 
governance problems persist. Limiting interventions to humanitarian purposes and 
working with non-governmental organizations are considered to be ways to deal with 
these problems (Wolfensohn and Bourguignon, 2004).
6 Contributing to the prevention of 
                                                           
6 The discussion on “state failure” is related to this problem. The World Bank uses a less judgmental term 
and refers to countries with low governance indicators and conflict situations to “low income countries 





conflicts is an important strategy to deal with this problem, as well. Food security, 
agricultural, and rural development programs in developing countries need to focus more 
explicitly on conflict prevention and mitigation, so that development assistance resources 
do not fuel conflict, as has happened in the past in Somalia, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Indonesia, 
and Colombia. This will usually require efforts to distribute assistance in an equitable and 
broad-based manner, so as not to encourage or exacerbate inter-group rivalries.  The 
benefits of conflict avoidance might be calculated as returns to aid investment.  At the 
same time, if emergency relief and post-conflict reconstruction programs are to move 
countries beyond periodic cycles of conflict, they need to focus on fostering sustainable 
food security and agricultural and rural development (Messer, Cohen, and D’Costa 1998; 
Messer, Cohen, and Marchione 2001).  
ADDRESSING VULNERABILITIES 
A reliable biosecurity system is critical for detecting and preventing the spread of 
disease before damage is inflicted (RAND 2003).  The development of biosecurity 
measures could therefore contribute to reducing developing country vulnerabilities. As in 
the case of promoting general security, establishing biosecurity systems is justified on 
other grounds besides reducing the risk from agroterrorist attacks: naturally occurring 
disease problems in crops and livestock already cause considerable problems for 
agricultural productivity, food security, and food safety in developing countries. 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) coined the 
term “biosecurity” in relation to sanitary, phytosanitary and zoosanitary measures applied 
in food and agricultural regulatory systems. It is a holistic concept, encompassing the 





safety, animal life and health, and plant life and health, including environmental risk. 
Biosecurity covers the introduction of plant pests and diseases, animal pests and diseases, 
and zoonoses, the introduction and release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
and their products, and the introduction and management of invasive alien species and 
genotypes (FAO 2003).  It addresses both deliberate and accidental introduction. 
Globalization and linkages through trade increase the likelihood of the movement of pests 
and disease from one location to another, either deliberately or inadvertently.  
Strengthening capacity in biosecurity is critical for promoting food security and access to 
agricultural markets thus promoting trade and development. Greater global cooperation in 
the form of financial aid and technical assistance to help build capacity in biosecurity 
would also assist developing countries to cope with any emerging specific threats of 
agroterrorism as well as the more general spread of pests and disease.   
However, to date, international funding for integrated approaches to biosecurity 
appears limited, with international priorities focusing on developing more narrowly 
focused biosafety systems for GMOs and GM products.  Currently, major donor 
organizations such as the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP),  United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank all manage 
biosafety capacity building programs, but have no comparable programs in biosecurity.  
For example, UNEP provides $38.4 M funding (UNEP 2004), and USAID provides 
$14.8M funding (USAID 2004) for biosafety in developing countries. FAO may soon 
spearhead the development, or coordination, of biosecurity capacity building programs 
(FAO 2003). Additionally, various amounts of financial support (at this time we are 





capacity in developing countries to meet the sanitary and phytosanitary standards 
demanded in developed-country markets, consistent with the relevant agreement (SPS) 
adopted by the World Trade Organization (WTO)
7.  Synergies are possible biosecurity 
and trade related food safety. Given the importance of agricultural exports to many 
developing counties’ economies the linkage to trade is especially important. 
The development and application of new technologies could reduce 
vulnerabilities of some types of terrorist threats. For example ricin, a highly toxic 
chemical made from by-products of the production of castor oil and classified by the 
Centers for Disease Control as a Class B bioterrorism agent, could be used by 
agroterrorists to contaminate food supplies in developing countries.  Components of the 
oil, known as hydroxy fatty acids, are essential for making high-quality lubricants for 
heavy equipment or jet engines, for example. Castor oil is also used in paints, coatings, 
plastics, antifungal compounds, shampoo, and cosmetics. The world demand for castor 
oil is about 1 billion pounds annually, valued at more than $400 million. The bulk of the 
annual castor crop is grown in developing countries, ensuring bioterrorists with access to 
this toxin.  Current attempts to develop transgenic plants with reduced expression of ricin 
in the castor seeds could reduce the potential threat from this source (ARS 2001).  
Transgenic crops with increased pest and disease resistance can have dual 
protection effects against both natural and terrorist-induced disasters. For example 
Eastern and Central Africa are currently witnessing the spread of a major coffee disease, 
coffee wilt. In Uganda, output has dropped by almost 20 percent, which translates into 
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ensure that the food that they import is safe to eat by the importing country’s own standards, and, at the 
same time, aims to ensure that strict health and safety regulations are not used to erect trade barriers to 





approximately a 30 percent reduction in incomes
8. If agroterrorists seek to spread this 
deadly scourge, there could be far-reaching effects. Besides causing severe hardship for 
poor rural households, collapse of cash crop incomes can be a factor that triggers violent 
conflict, especially when a country depends heavily on export earnings from that crop.  
Uganda derives 27 percent of export revenues from coffee (Messer and Cohen, 2004). 
However, the export of technological capacity raises security concerns about the 
potential “dual-use” applications of these technologies to development of biological 
warfare agents, which may result in innovating countries embargoing the flow of 
biotechnologies to the developing world due to security concerns. These biotechnologies 
may include either R&D processes necessary to produce biotechnologies, or adaptable 
biotechnologies that have legitimate uses. For example the technology necessary to 
produce virus detection kits for animal or wildlife diseases may be used as an input to the 
development of biological weapons. Biotechnology innovations have the potential to help 
alleviate specific problems in the developing world (Huang
 et al. 2002) and more 
technologies are in the process of being developed to address country- and region-
specific needs (Atanassov et al. 2004). Efforts to curtail the biotechnology innovation 
process in the developing world may limit opportunities for resolving many issues that 
have proven to be intractable under other technological approaches and will have a direct 
impact on the livelihoods of people in the developing world. Therefore, from a societal 
point of view, there is clearly a trade-off between potential gains from the use of 
biotechnology in the area of biosecurity, amongst many others, and the risks to security in 
developed nations. This trade-off is a matter of concern, because there is a broad range of 
technologies can be considered “dual use,” and industrialized countries that consider 
                                                           





themselves to be under high risk of terrorist attacks may place restrictions on technology 
transfer which limit the growth potential of developing countries.  
Such technology developments may themselves be controversial and may require 
biosafety assessments. 
ADDRESSING CONSEQUENCES 
With regard to managing consequences, building domestic capacity for 
emergency aid (both food security and public health) and providing international aid in 
case of agroterrorist attacks may be the most effective form of risk management.  
However, the recent Tsunami affecting much of Asia shows that monitoring systems, 
while not preventing disasters, can help minimize the extent of consequences and 
therefore monitoring may be a prudent allocation of society’s resources. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
In any risk strategy there are three management options: (1) accept the risk, (2) 
manage the risk, or (3) avoid the risk.  The default position of many developing countries 
is the acceptance of the risk of agroterrorism with very limited attempts at risk 
management.  The presumption is that the risk is low.  However, the previous analysis 
suggests that, while it is difficult to be clear about specific threats posed to agriculture in 
developing countries, it is conceivable that some developing countries will find that the 
general threat environment, vulnerability, and consequences are such that the risk is high. 
As the analysis has shown, developing countries are in general more vulnerable to 
agroterrorist attacks than industrialized countries and they have a lower capacity to deal 





This does not mean that specific threats will materialize; however, it does mean 
that the potential exists for specific threats to develop as the security environment 
changes.  Therefore more analysis is needed of specific emerging threats of agroterrorism 
in developing countries. This will help to identify situations in which spending scarce 
resources for preventing such threats is justified. There is, however, a problem with 
waiting for the emergence of such specific threats.  When specific intelligence emerges it 
may be too late to take action on the development of biosecurity infrastructure.  
We hope to have shown in this paper that the potential threat of agroterrorism is 
an additional reason for the international community to invest more resources in activities 
that are already justified on more general grounds: contributing to the prevention of 
conflicts and to promoting security, including biosecurity, and assuring food safety and 
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